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The Illusory Right to Counsel
EVE BRENSIKE PRIMUS*

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a woman wrongly accused of murdering her fianc6. She is
arrested and charged with first-degree murder. If convicted, she faces a
mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Her family
scrapes together enough money to hire two attorneys to represent her at
trial. There is no physical evidence connecting her to the murder, but the
prosecution builds its case on circumstantial inferences. Her trial attorneys
admit that they were so cocky and confident that she would be acquitted that
they did not bother to investigate her case or file a single pre-trial motion.
Rather, they waived the right to a jury trial and had a bench trial in front of
a judge who, in the past, had been disciplined twice for discriminating
against people of the defendant's race. She is convicted and sentenced to
life without the possibility of parole.
She appeals and gets new counsel, but her appellate attorney fails to
raise the most meritorious legal claim-namely, that her trial attorneys were
ineffective for failing to investigate her case. She loses on appeal. She
finds a post-conviction attorney who raises the incompetence of her trial
attorneys in a post-conviction motion filed in the state courts, but the state
courts say that she should have raised that issue on appeal and it is now
waived.
Her post-conviction attorney then files a federal habeas corpus petition
alleging that she received constitutionally ineffective trial counsel. The
federal district judge-a Reagan appointee-has a hearing and finds that
she had woefully ineffective assistance of trial counsel and grants her
petition, noting her probable innocence, only to have the United States
Court of Appeals reverse and reinstate her conviction. Even though she had
terrible trial counsel, she cannot get habeas relief, because she failed to raise
that claim at the appropriate time-namely, on appeal. If her appellate
attorney was constitutionally ineffective, it might excuse her failure to raise
the trial attorney ineffectiveness claim properly, but her state postconviction attorney failed to raise a claim about the incompetence of her
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank the organizers
of the Carhart Symposium at Ohio Northern University Petit College of Law as well as the participants
for their valuable contributions to these remarks.
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appellate counsel so that claim is now also waived. Absent clemency, she
must spend the rest of her life in prison even though everyone
acknowledges that she had a sham of a trial.
This is a real story and not just a law school hypothetical,' and it is
representative of what happens in a shocking number of criminal cases
across the country. The United States Supreme Court has described the
right to effective counsel as 'necessary to insure [the] fundamental human
rights of life and liberty[.]"' 2 In practice, however, the right to counsel in
our criminal justice system is, in many respects, illusory. Not everyone is
entitled to the assistance of trial counsel and even those who are often have
trial attorneys who are unable or unwilling to provide effective
representation. And the picture only gets worse at the appellate and postconviction review stages as litigants run into increasingly complex
procedural barriers that prevent them from having their ineffectiveness
claims heard.
No symposium designed to address crises in the legal profession would
be complete without a discussion of our systematic failure to provide
competent legal representation to criminal defendants. In these remarks, I
will analyze each stage of the criminal process from the trial to direct
appeal, through the state post-conviction process, and into federal habeas
corpus proceedings and explain how, at each stage, criminal defendants
routinely face the threat of incarceration (or continued incarceration)
without the aid of competent counsel. In addition to failing to provide
effective representation, I will demonstrate how the criminal justice system
essentially prevents defendants from ever being able to challenge their
counsels' ineffective performance, thus rendering the right to effective
counsel a right without a remedy. Finally, I will offer some possible
suggestions for ways to reform the criminal justice system so as to restore
meaning to the fundamental right to counsel.
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT TRIAL

In 1963, when the Supreme Court held that Clarence Gideon was
entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel at his state criminal trial, it
used broad, sweeping language to describe the importance of the

1. See Hargrave-Thomas v. Yukins, 374 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2004). The Governor of Michigan
ultimately commuted Ms. Hargrave-Thomas's sentence and released her from prison. See Granholm
Frees Woman Who Fatally Stabbed Ex-Fiance, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (August 6, 2008, 3:56 AM),

available at http://blog.mlive.com/grpress/2008/08/granholm_frees-woman-who fatal.html.
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
462 (1938)).
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constitutional right to trial counsel.3 "The Sixth Amendment," it said
"stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it
provides be lost, justice will not 'still be done."" Given that the Supreme
Court had already stated that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind
of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has[,]" 5 many
thought that Gideon was the start of an expansive and meaningful right to
the assistance of appointed counsel in criminal proceedings. Over time,
however, it became clear that not everyone was entitled to appointed legal
counsel at trial and even those who were entitled to lawyers often did not
have counsel appointed until very late in the process and were surprised to
learn that their attorneys were unable or unwilling to provide quality
representation.
A. Who has a Sixth Amendment right to trialcounsel?
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution says, "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the

Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 6 That is certainly true for those
who have the money to pay for attorneys. However, an overwhelming
majority of criminal defendants are indigent,7 and the Supreme Court has
narrowly construed what a criminal prosecution is for purposes of
establishing the contours of the right to appointed trial counsel. Only felons
and misdemeanants who are sentenced to a term of imprisonment are
entitled to have the assistance of appointed counsel.8 If a criminal
defendant is charged with a misdemeanor that carries a possible jail
sentence, but he is ultimately given a sentence that does not include jail
time, he is not entitled to the assistance of counsel to fight the charges
against him.9 It does not matter if the sentence includes an exorbitant fine, a
long period of probation,'o or will result in severe collateral consequences.
3. See id. (quoting Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-244 (1936)).
4. Id. at 343 (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462).
5. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
7. See Steven K. Smith & Carol J. DeFrances, Indigent Defense, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 4
(Feb. 1996), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf (noting that more than eighty
percent of criminal defendants nationwide are represented by assigned counsel).
8. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339 (incorporating the Sixth Amendment against the states and
holding that felony defendants are entitled to lawyers); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979)
(holding that the Sixth Amendment only guarantees a right to counsel to misdemeanants who are actually imprisoned after conviction).
9. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 369.
10. If the probation includes a suspended prison sentence, however, that would constitute actual
incarceration, which would entitle the defendant to an attorney. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654,
658 (2002) (quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972)).
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In a world of three strikes laws" and mandatory deportation for many
misdemeanor offenses,12 the consequences of not having counsel for these
seemingly minor offenses are often serious.
Moreover, the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel only applies
to true criminal prosecutions and does not extend to parole or probation
revocation hearings even if they could result in substantial jail time. 13 This
might be particularly surprising to a defendant who faces years in prison if
she is found to be in violation of her probation conditions. Nor does it
extend to grand jury proceedings that are used to start criminal
proceedings 4 or to immigration deportation hearings that happen as a result
of criminal proceedings. 5
Although misdemeanor prosecutions and probation revocation hearings
consume much of the state courts' limited resources,16 many of the
defendants in these proceedings are not entitled to the assistance of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment. The only way indigents can obtain appointed
counsel in these proceedings is by arguing that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees them an attorney.' 7 Such claims are
rarely raised and even more rarely granted, in part because the standard for
determining when an individual is entitled to an attorney under the Due
Process Clause is very state-friendly.
Even when defendants are constitutionally entitled to counsel, their
right to counsel is often violated. A report commissioned by a joint
11.

See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 67 (2003) (discussing California's three strikes

law).
12. Cf Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (explaining the proliferation of immigration consequences for criminal convictions).
13. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 414 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that there is no
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in grand jury proceedings); Fuller v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 903, 907-08
(5th Cir. 1998) (same).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Campos-Asencio, 822 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Mantell
v. United States Dep't of Justice, I.N.S., 798 F.2d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1986)) ("Because deportation is a
civil proceeding, potential deportees have no sixth amendment right to counsel."); cf also Lassiter v.
Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981) (holding that there is no Sixth Amendment right to
counsel for termination of parental rights hearings).
16. See, e.g., Robert C. Boruchowitz, Diverting and Reclassifying Misdemeanors Could Save $1
Billion per Year: Reducing the Need For and Cost ofAppointed Counsel, AM. CONST. SOC'Y FOR LAW
AND POL'Y ISSUE BRIEF 1 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/
Boruchowitz_-_Misdemeanors.pdf (noting that minor, non-violent offenses can make up between 40%
and 50% of the caseload in some courts).
17. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790 (emphasizing that, even when the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel does not apply, a defendant can still argue for a due process right to an attorney).
18. The defendant must prove that there are special circumstances in his case that require the
assistance of counsel. See id at 788-90 (endorsing the Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), special
circumstances test and arguing that the question whether someone is entitled to counsel under the due
process clause involves a case-by-case analysis).
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resolution of the Michigan state legislature documented counties in that
state where defendants were charged and pled guilty to crimes that carry jail
time without ever speaking to a lawyer.19 When I was in practice as a
public defender in Maryland, I routinely witnessed judges who found that
alleged misdemeanants had impliedly waived their rights to counsel, thus
forcing individuals to proceed pro se.20 Even though the Sixth Amendment
says that defendants in "all" criminal prosecutions shall have counsel, in
reality, only a fraction of indigent criminal defendants receive appointed
counsel.
B. When is the right to trialcounsel triggeredand when is a defendant
entitled to have counsel present?
For those who are entitled to appointed counsel, it is unclear in many
jurisdictions when an attorney will be assigned to a case and whether that
attorney will meet with her client before trial. According to the Supreme
Court, a defendant's right to counsel attaches at the first formal hearing
before a judicial officer, where the defendant learns the charges against him
and his liberty is subject to restriction.21 Often, lawyers are not appointed
immediately after the first formal hearing. It can take weeks or even
months to appoint counsel in some jurisdictions.22 One fifty-year-old
woman who was arrested for shoplifting spent eleven months in jail waiting
for a lawyer to be appointed while another woman charged with stealing
from a slot machine spent eight months in jail before getting a lawyer.2 3 In
many jurisdictions, attorneys routinely meet their clients for the first time on
the trial court date. Courts often do not find such delays problematic as
long as the defense attorney is present for all "critical stages" of the
prosecution.

19.

See A Race to the Bottom: Speed & Savings Over Due Process: A Constitutional Crisis,

NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER Assoc. ii (June 2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/

topics/Plenaryl/JWallace-RacetoTheBottom.pdf; see also Eric H. Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., Remarks at
the Brennan Legacy Awards Dinner, Brennan Center for Justice (Nov. 17, 2009) available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/attorneygeneral ericholder on indigent defense refo
rm [hereinafter Holder Remarks] (summarizing the report).
20. See also Holder Remarks, supra note 19 ("In 2005 ... in one Florida Circuit, three out of
four youth waived the right to counsel and faced charges without the guidance of counsel. What is more,
such waivers sometimes occur without the opportunity to speak to counsel who might help young people
understand what they're giving up." (emphasis in original)).
21. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (2008).
22. See Holder Remarks, supra note 19 (describing the problem of delay); see also Rothgery, 554
U.S. at 196 (noting that the defendant in that case was not appointed a lawyer until six months after his
first formal hearing).
23. See Holder Remarks, supra note 19 (describing these cases).
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Defendants are constitutionally entitled to have their attorneys present
24
only at "critical stages" of a prosecution. What constitutes a critical stage
is debatable. 25 The Court has held that trials, pleas, police interrogations,
and corporeal line-ups are critical stages. 26 Most recently, the Supreme
Court has stated that critical stages include "proceedings between an
individual and agents of the State . . . that amount to 'trial-like

confrontations,' at which counsel would help the accused 'in coping with
legal problems . . . or in meeting his adversary[.]"' 2 7 However, in many
states, bail review hearings are not considered critical stages even though
defendants often make incriminating statements in the course of answering
questions about their eligibility to be released on bond.28 In the end,
defendants who are constitutionally entitled to appointed representation at
trial often do not receive much in the way of pre-trial assistance from their
attorneys. This failure to ensure that counsel is appointed early and is
actively preparing a case for trial contributes to the problem of trial attorney
ineffectiveness later.
C.

What does it mean to have a right to effective trialcounsel?

Perhaps the biggest failure of our state-level indigent defense delivery
systems is the failure to provide those defendants who do get attorneys with
effective legal representation. The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel includes a right to effective assistance of
counsel. 2 9 The evidence of ineffective trial attorney performance, however,
is overwhelming and seemingly universal.
First, there are far too many examples of what I have called "personal"
ineffectiveness.30 Attorneys who sleep through trial, 31 abuse alcohol or
drugs during their representation of a client, 32 or are just too lazy or cocky
24. See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 212.
25. See, e.g., id. at 213-14 (Alito, J., concurring specially to note that there was no holding regarding whether a Texas magistration hearing was a critical stage; rather there was only a holding that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at that hearing).
26. See id. at 217 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing what the Supreme Court has held to be a
critical stage in a criminal prosecution).
27. Id.at2l2n.16.
28. See, e.g., Fenner v. State, 846 A.2d 1020 (Md. 2004).
29. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
30. See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 686 (2007).
31. See, e.g., Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950, 952 (5th Cir. 2000), vacated, 262 F.3d 336 (5th
Cir. 2001) (en banc) (involving allegations that defense counsel slept through substantial portions of the
trial).
32. See Paul Duggan, In Texas, Defense Lapses Fail to Halt Executions: Attorneys' Ineptitude
Doesn't Halt Executions, WASH. POST, May 12, 2000, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentld=A52193-2000Mayl1 &notFound-true.
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to investigate their cases or meet with their clients33 fall in this category.
These attorneys are personally at fault for their ineffectiveness. 34 Although
the problem of personal ineffectiveness is quite widespread and has been
openly acknowledged by judges for decades, the public typically learns
about only the most salient examples of personal ineffectiveness. For
example, the Supreme Court in recent years has reversed death penalty
sentences because defense attorneys have failed to do such basic things as
examine court files, 36 or investigate the defendant's life history to present
mitigating evidence at sentencing. 37 If attorneys fail to conduct even
minimal investigation when the defendant's life is on the line, one can only
imagine how serious the problem of personal ineffectiveness is in cases
where the ultimate punishment is not at stake.
In contrast to personal ineffectiveness, there are those attorneys who are
rendered ineffective by virtue of the heavy caseloads that they are forced to
carry. Overworked and underfunded indigent defense delivery systems lead
to what I have called "structural" ineffectiveness. 38 The National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals as well as the
American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice explain that no
defense attorney can effectively handle more than 150 felony cases or 400
misdemeanors in one year.3 9 Yet, severe underfunding of indigent defense
means that public defenders nationwide are repeatedly forced to handle
33. See, e.g., Hargrave-Thomas v. Yukins, 236 F. Supp. 2d 750, 769 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (emphasizing that Ms. Hargrave-Thomas's trial attorney "admitted a complete failure to interview any potential
witnesses or conduct an investigation before trial [because] he was 'cocky' . . . and [therefore thought]
that it was ... unnecessary to investigate[.]").
34. For an excellent collection of instances in which capital defense attorneys provided deficient
representation, see WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN
CAPITAL CASES 3-8 (2006).
35. See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2
(1973) ("[A] great many-if not most-indigent defendants do not receive the effective assistance of
counsel guaranteed them by the 6th Amendment."); Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy:
Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42
FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 234 (1973) ("[Flrom one-third to one-half of the lawyers who appear in the
serious cases are not really qualified to render fully adequate representation.").
36. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377, 379-80 (2005).
37. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 516 (2003).
38. See Primus, supra note 30, at 687-88.
39. See J. Frank E. Lee, et. al., Special Issues, Third Conference Session Before the National
Conference of Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (Jan. 25, 1973), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 186 (1976); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVIDING
DEFENSE SERVICES 72 (3d ed. 1992); see also Ten Principles ofa Public Defense Delivery System, ABA
STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS 5 n.19 (Feb. 2002), available at

http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf (noting
the figures of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Task Force
on Courts, which provide for a maximum caseload per year of 150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200
juvenile cases, 200 mental health cases, or 25 appeals).
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caseloads that far exceed these national standards. When I was a public
defender in Maryland, for example, public defenders in Baltimore city
averaged over 1,100 misdemeanor cases per year-almost three times the
national standard.4 0 In Tennessee in 2006, six attorneys handled more than
10,0000 misdemeanor cases. 4 ' That is over 1,600 cases per attorney. In
Rhode Island in 2003, "public defender felony caseloads surpass[ed]
national standards by 35-40% and misdemeanor caseloads exceed[ed]
national standards by 15 0 %."A2 And in Missouri, the State Public Defender
Director acknowledged publicly that lawyers were making mistakes due to
their high caseloads.4 3 As part of this symposium, the Director of the Ohio
Public Defender Office explained that Ohio's caseloads continue to increase
while, at the same time, its funding is decreasing."
The dramatically high caseloads that public defenders are forced to
carry are just one example of the structural ineffectiveness problems that
plague many of our state criminal justice systems. Seven states in this
nation continue to provide nothing for trial level indigent defense funding,
which places the entire burden of funding indigent defense on the individual
counties. 4 5 This means that the quality of representation in these states
varies dramatically from county to county. For example, some city public
defenders' offices in Louisiana used to be funded solely through parking
ticket revenue. 4 6 When the city of East Baton Rouge ran out of pre-printed
traffic tickets in the first half of one year, the indigent defender program's
sole source of income was suspended until more tickets were printed.4 7
Additionally, there are many jurisdictions in which structural
ineffectiveness problems exist due to insufficient defender independence.
Consider Nebraska, where a statewide survey of judges in 2006 explained
that there were judges throughout the state who were refusing to appoint

40. See Bruce A. Myers, PerformanceAudit Report, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AUDITS, DEP'T OF
LEGISLATIVE SERVS., MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 15 (2001), available at http://www.ola.state.md.us/Reports/

Performance/PubDefen.pdf.
41. See Holder Remarks, supra note 19 (describing this jurisdiction).
42. See Gideon's Broken Promise: America 's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice, A Report on
the American Bar Association's Hearings on the Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, ABA COMM. ON
LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDERS, 18 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.bu.edu/lawlibrary/PDFs

/research/portals/probonofiles/righttocounselreport.pdf [hereinafter Gideon's Broken Promise].
43. See Holder Remarks, supra note 19.
44. See Timothy Young, Director of the Office of the Ohio Public Defender, Remarks at the
Carhart Symposium, Ohio Northern University Petit College of Law (March 20, 2011) (explaining that
the Ohio Public Defender Office has 269,854 cases in 1999 and 424,900 cases projected for 2011, but
had less funding in 2011 for those cases).
45. See Holder Remarks, supranote 19.
46. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993).
47. Seeid.atn.10.
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lawyers who requested too many trials. 48 Similarly, in one Nevada county,
judges were known for punishing attorneys who requested funds to hire
experts. 49 And in Michigan, attorneys who apply for higher than normal
fees due to the time spent on a case may be removed from the courtappointed list if they continue to apply because they are costing the county
too much money.so
The problems of personal and structural ineffectiveness have reached
such epic proportions that both the federal executive and legislative
Such reform is
branches have begun looking for possible reforms.5
necessary because the judicial system, as currently structured, does little to
police the problem of ineffective trial attorney performance. As the
American Bar Association recently stated after conducting hearings on our
indigent defense delivery systems, "thousands of persons are processed
through America's courts every year either with no lawyer at all or with a
lawyer who does not have the time, resources, or in some cases the
inclination to provide effective representation . . . The fundamental right to

a lawyer that Americans assume appl[ies] to everyone accused of criminal
conduct effectively does not exist in practice for countless people across the
United States."
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON DIRECT APPEAL
The picture does not get much better at the appellate level. Although
the Supreme Court has recognized that defendants have a constitutional
48. See Holder Remarks, supra note 19.
49. See Gideon's Broken Promise, supra note 42, at 21.
50. See Gideon 's Broken Promise, supra note 42, at 21.
51. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Prominent Harvard Law Professor Joins Justice Department,
WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2010, at A9, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/
2010/02/25/AR2010022505697.html (describing how President Obama has appointed Harvard Law
Professor Laurence Tribe to spearhead a new internal working group at the U.S. Department of Justice
designed to study and make recommendations about how to improve indigent defense delivery systems).
Congress has held numerous hearings on the indigent defense crisis. See Representation of Indigent
Defendants in Criminal Cases: A Constitutional Crisis in Michigan and Other States, Hearing Before
the S. Comm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/l11-20 48233.PDF; Indigent Representation: A
Growing National Crisis, Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.,
I llth Cong. (2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/1I1th/l1 11-29 50068.PDF;
see also Press Release, The Constitution Project, National Right to Counsel Committee Members Testify
on Indigent Defense Crisis and Issue Urgent Call for Reforms (June 4, 2009), available at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/newsdetail.asp?id=380 (discussing testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security). Senator Patrick Leahy introduced
legislation attempting to address some aspects of the problem, but the bill did not made it out of committee. See S.B. 3842, 111 th Cong. (2010), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=
si 11-3842.
52. Gideon s Broken Promise, supra note 42, at iv.
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right to an effective appellate attorney on their first appeals as of right," that
right to counsel is cut off after the initial appeal.54 Defendants are not
constitutionally entitled to counsel when filing certiorari petitions to the
highest state court or to the United States Supreme Court. Thus, the first
appeal is often a defendant's last opportunity to have the assistance of
counsel to argue that his rights were violated.
In practice, however, a majority of jurisdictions limit the issues that
appellate attorneys are able to raise on direct review. In most jurisdictions,
for example, appellate counsel may only raise errors that appear on the face
of the trial court record.55 This typically means errors by the judges in
ruling on motions and objections. Any errors that would require the
appellate court to consider evidence outside of the trial record are not
cognizable. Notably, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
prosecutorial misconduct for failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, and
juror or judge bias often fall into this category. Theoretically, an appellate
attorney could raise a constitutional challenge to the effectiveness of her
trial attorney's performance (assuming of course that appellate counsel is
different from trial counsel, which is not always the case). However, given
that ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are often based on what
trial attorneys failed to do, extra-record evidence is often necessary to
substantiate the claims. As a result, the prohibition on looking beyond the
trial court record effectively prevents most appellate counsel from
challenging trial attorneys' performance.
Without the ability to challenge trial attorney performance, many
appellate defenders are left with few issues to raise on appeal. After all, if
trial counsel was inadequate and failed to investigate the case, meet with the
client, file a motion, or raise objections, there are no errors "on the record."
Consequently, appellate attorneys file a staggering number of motions
asking to withdraw from cases, because they are unable to find a single
meritorious issue worth briefing.s These Anders motions-named after the
Supreme Court case in which they were first recognized 57 -Comprise up to
53. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (recognizing a constitutional right to
counsel on the first appeal as of right under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469
U.S. 387, 402 (1985) (guaranteeing the right to effective assistance of appellate counsel on that first
appeal as of right).
54. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974) (holding that there is no constitutional right to
counsel for direct appeals beyond the first appeal as of right).
55.

See, e.g., 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§ 27.5(c) (2d

ed. 1999) ("Per-

haps no standard governing the scope of appellate review is more frequently applied than the rule that
'an error not raised and preserved at trial will not be considered on appeal."') (quoting State v. Green,
621 P.2d 67, 68 (Or. Ct. App. 1980)).
56. See Primus, supra note 30, at 701-06 (describing this problem).
57. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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a third of the criminal appellate cases in states that allow them.58 Given the
overwhelming and pervasive evidence of structural trial attorney
ineffectiveness, it cannot be that a third of the cases are error free. Likely,
many of these defendants had constitutionally ineffective trial attorneys, but
their appellate attorneys cannot raise that claim.
Not all states allow appellate attorneys to file Anders motions.59 In
states where such motions are not permitted, appellate attorneys often have
no choice but to research and brief frivolous issues. This is an enormous
waste of state resources. States spend millions of dollars each year
providing indigent defendants with appellate counsel for their first
appeals;60 yet, appellate counsel is prohibited from raising the most serious
constitutional violation that we know infects a large number of indigent
criminal cases-namely, ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Thus, direct
appellate review as it is currently structured does not meaningfully protect
the constitutional right to counsel.
III. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN STATE POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS

A majority of jurisdictions encourage criminal defendants to wait until
state post-conviction review to raise claims of trial or appellate attorney
ineffectiveness.2 In theory, states could use their post-conviction processes
to ensure that defendants have meaningful and effective trial representation.
In reality, however, there is no meaningful review of trial counsels'
performance at the state post-conviction stage.
As an initial matter, in some jurisdictions only those defendants who are
still in state custody after concluding direct appellate review are permitted

58. See Martha C. Warner, Anders in the Fifty States: Some Appellants' Equal Protection is
More Equal than Others', 23 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 625, 642-43, 668-87 (1996) (noting that appellate
briefs seeking to withdraw from frivolous appeals constitute more than thirty percent of the appellate
caseload in some jurisdictions); see also Roger J. Miner, Lecture, ProfessionalResponsibility in Appellate Practice:A View From the Bench, 19 PACE L. REV. 323, 325 (1999) ("Of the 850 criminal appeals
filed in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 1997, eighty-two were accompanied by Anders briefs."
(citation omitted)); Christopher Stogel, Note, Smith v. Robbins: Appointed Criminal Appellate Counsel
Should Watch for the Wende in their Hair, 31 Sw. U. L. REV. 281 (2002) ("Sixteen hundred criminal
appeals are filed by indigent defendants every year in California. Twenty to twenty-five percent of those
appeals are considered meritless by the attorney appointed to represent the defendant." (citation omitted)).
59. See Warner, supra note 58, at 642 (noting that ten states have rejected the Anders procedure).
60. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE STATE APPELLATE DEFENDER, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR

2004 (2004), availableat http://www.state.il.us/DEFENDER/ar04.html (stating that the operating budget
approved for fiscal year 2004 was $22,481,263).
61. For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see Primus, supranote 30, at 701-06.
62. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 734-36 (Pa. 2002) (summarizing jurisdictions).
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to file state post-conviction petitions.6 3 Given that the direct appellate
process can take years to complete,6 the vast majority of criminal
defendants will have completed their sentences before they even get to state
post-conviction. In many states, given inmates' ability to earn good time
credits to shorten the length of their sentences, 6 5 only defendants with long
prison sentences are still in custody by the time they get to the postconviction review stage.66 Once they are released from custody, they are no
longer permitted to file post-conviction petitions. Even if a defendant is in a
jurisdiction that does not have a strict custody requirement for filing postconviction petitions, once the defendant has completed her sentence, she has
little incentive to continue to challenge the underlying conviction. 6 7
Those defendants who are able and willing to file state post-conviction
motions will often have to represent themselves, because they have no
constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings (even in
capital cases).68 Collecting the extra-record evidence to show that your trial
attorney was constitutionally ineffective is particularly difficult if you are in
custody and do not have the assistance of a lawyer. How are you supposed
to supplement the trial court record from inside a prison cell?6 9
63.

See, e.g., id. at 741 (Saylor, J., concurring) (describing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§

9543(a)(1) (1998), which provides that in order to be eligible for post-conviction relief, "a petitioner
must at the time relief is granted: be currently serving a sentence of imprisonment or [be on] probation or
on parole; [be] awaiting execution; or [be] serving a sentence which must expire before the person may
commence serving the disputed sentence.").
64. See, e.g., Marc M. Arkin, Speedy Criminal Appeal: A Right Without a Remedy, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 437, 437-38 (1990) (explaining that, because of the docket backlog in appellate courts, "[d]elays of
six years, while 'shocking,' are not 'unusual"' (quoting Mathis v. Hood, 851 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir.
1988))); see also Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597, 602 (Pa. 2005) (explaining that direct appeals in Pennsylvania may take "more than four years to be completed"); Preliminary Proceedings, 35
GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 203, 360 n.1210 (2006) (collecting cases involving delays ranging
from two to thirteen years).
65. See, e.g., TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 498.002 (2010) (allowing inmates to earn up to thirty
days of good conduct time for each thirty days actually served); see also Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The
Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 YALE
L.J. 933, 937 n.19 (1995) (explaining that "good time" laws under which inmates can work off up to a
third of their original sentence are routine in most states).
66. See Primus, supra note 30, at 693.
67. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Proposal and Analysis ofa Unitary System for Review of Criminal Judgments, 54 B.U. L. REV. 485, 495 n.32 (1974) (noting that released defendants are unlikely to file
for post-conviction relief "given the absence of the motivation generated by incarceration.").
68. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (holding that there is no constitutional
right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings); see also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (extending Finley to capital cases).
69. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Litigation of Ineffective Assistance Claims: Some
Uncomfortable Reflections on Massaro v. United States, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 793, 799 (2004) (noting that
an incarcerated prisoner cannot interview trial counsel or find witnesses and therefore does not have a
.'full and fair' opportunity to litigate the issue [of ineffective assistance of counsel] in state court"); cf
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 621 (2005) (emphasizing the fact that "[s]even out often inmates fall
in the lowest two out of five levels of literacy" and that many inmates "have learning disabilities and
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Even if a criminal defendant manages to raise the ineffective assistance
of trial counsel claim properly at the state post-conviction stage, the
Strickland v. Washington7 0 standard that is currently used to assess a trial
attorney's effectiveness makes it incredibly difficult for the defendant to
prevail. Under the current standard, a trial attorney is constitutionally
ineffective if (1) the attorney's performance is deficient, meaning that the
attorney performed unreasonably given prevailing norms of practice, and
(2) this deficient performance prejudiced the defense, meaning that
counsel's errors were serious enough to undermine confidence in the
outcome of the trial. 7 1 The Strickland standard is intentionally open-ended
in order to give a great deal of latitude to defense counsel.72 Although the
Supreme Court has said that American Bar Association standards can be
"guides," a defense attorney's failure to comply with these standards is not
dispositive.7 3 Moreover, courts routinely presume that defense attorneys'
decisions to raise or not raise issues are tactical decisions that are entitled to
deference, which makes it very difficult for a defendant to show deficient
performance.74 And the prejudice component requires the defendant to
show that the trial attorney's deficient performance affected the outcome.
In order to do that, however, the defendant has to show what effective
counsel could have done but did not. That is very hard for a prison inmate
to do without the assistance of counsel or someone on the outside. For all
of these reasons, the Strickland standard has been repeatedly criticized for
providing too little protection to criminal defendants.
In short, in the majority of jurisdictions where trial attorney
ineffectiveness challenges must be raised at the state post-conviction review
stage, the right to effective trial counsel is essentially a right without a
remedy. Many criminal defendants are never permitted to raise the claim,
mental impairments" that make it nearly impossible for them to navigate the legal process without assistance (citation omitted)).

70. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
71. See id. at 687-88.
72. See id. at 689 (describing "the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.").
73. See id. at 688-89.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[E]very indulgence
will be given to the possibility that a seeming lapse or error by defense counsel was in fact a tactical
move, flawed only in hindsight.").
75. See, e.g., William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 94 (1995); Gary Goodpaster, The
Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 59 (1986); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure
and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 20 (1997); Russell L. Weaver, The Perils of Being Poor: Indigent Defense and Effective Assistance, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 435, 440-46 (2003-04); see also McFarland v.
Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1259-61 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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and those who are able to raise the claim are not given the means to raise it
effectively. Moreover, even if a criminal defendant is able to raise a trial
attorney ineffectiveness claim, the current standard for reviewing trial
attorneys' performance is highly deferential and does very little to ensure
that criminal defendants have meaningful trial representation.
IV. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS

Prisoners who hope that the federal courts will be more receptive to
their constitutional claims of attorney ineffectiveness are often surprised to
learn of the myriad substantive and procedural obstacles to obtaining federal
habeas corpus relief. Just as there is no constitutional right to counsel for
state post-conviction review, there is no constitutional right to federal
habeas counsel. 76 As a result, approximately ninety-two percent of noncapital habeas petitioners do not have attorneys to represent them.77 Once
again, these defendants have to figure out how to supplement their trial
records from within their prison cells in order to provide the federal courts
with extra-record evidence of their trial attorneys' ineffectiveness. 78
These pro se petitioners also have to maneuver through a maze of
substantive and procedural obstacles before they can obtain relief in federal
court. Substantively, only some claims of attorney ineffectiveness are
cognizable in federal habeas. According to 28 U.S.C. section 2254(i),
"[t]he ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State
collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a
[habeas corpus] proceeding[.]" 79 Additionally, the Supreme Court has held
that, because there is no constitutional right to counsel beyond the first
appeal as of right, there is no remedy if you have a direct appellate lawyer
who turns out to be ineffective beyond the first appeal.o Thus, the only

76. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756-57 (1991) (noting that prisoners have no
constitutional right to counsel in the post-conviction context).
77. See Nancy J. King et al., Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts:
An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 23 (Aug. 2007) [hereinafter King Report], available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219559.pdf.
78. All of these individuals are still in custody when they file their habeas corpus petitions because custody is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a federal habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)
(Lexis Nexis 2006).

79. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i).
80. See Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (noting that, because there is no
constitutional right to counsel beyond the first appeal as of right, there is no remedy if you have a lawyer
who turns out to be ineffective beyond the first appeal); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 757 (1991) (noting that,
because there is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction appellate proceedings, there is no
remedy for ineffective performance by counsel at that stage).
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attorneys whose ineffectiveness a habeas petitioner can challenge are the
trial attorney and appellate attorney for the first appeal as of right.
Procedurally, before the federal court will address the merits in any
habeas petition, the petitioner has to demonstrate that the petition is timely
filed in accordance with a statutorily-prescribed one year statute of
limitations. 8 1 According to a recent empirical study, approximately twentytwo percent of non-capital federal habeas corpus petitions are dismissed for
failure to comply with this statute of limitations.82
If a habeas petitioner manages to file a timely petition, there are still
various procedural barriers to having each claim heard. Before the federal
court will entertain challenges to trial or appellate counsels' performance,
the petitioner has to satisfy the exhaustion and procedural default
requirements. Grounded in principles of federalism and finality as well as
conservation of resources, the exhaustion principle requires criminal
defendants to present all constitutional claims to the state courts before
filing them in federal court. States should be given an early opportunity to
correct any mistakes before federal resources are expended and state court
convictions are disrupted by federal court review.
For similar reasons, the procedural default doctrine requires federal
habeas courts to respect adequate and independent state procedural grounds
for denying federal constitutional claims.84 If a defendant fails to comply
with an adequate and independent state procedural rule and, as a result, the
state court refuses to hear his underlying federal constitutional claims, the
federal courts typically will respect that state court ruling and refuse to hear
the underlying claim as well.
The exhaustion and procedural default doctrines are serious obstacles to
obtaining federal habeas relief for any petitioner, but they create a particular
hardship for defendants who want to allege that their trial and/or appellate
attorneys' performance was constitutionally deficient. Because a majority
of states have procedural rules that require defendants to raise claims about
the ineffectiveness of their trial and/or appellate attorneys at the state post81. See 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2006).
82. See King Report, supra note 77, at 7.
83. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(b) ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that . . . the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State[.]"); see also Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509, 510, 522 (1982) (requiring state prisoners to exhaust all claims for relief in the state courts
before presenting those claims to the federal courts).
84. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (holding that a state prisoner whose
federal claim is not heard in state court due to his failure to comply with an independent and adequate
state procedural rule will typically not have that claim considered in federal court); see also Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002) (same).
85. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87; Lee, 534 U.S. at 375.
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conviction stage and because those same states typically do not provide
defendants with counsel to assist them in raising the claims properly at that
stage, many pro se defendants screw it up. They either fail to raise one or
both ineffectiveness claims (thus running afoul of the exhaustion
requirement) or they fail to properly raise the claims in accordance with the
state's procedural rules (thus running afoul of the procedural default
doctrine).86 For those who simply failed to raise the claims, by the time
they get to federal habeas review, state procedural rules typically preclude
them from returning to state court to exhaust the unexhausted claims and
they are then deemed to have procedurally defaulted the claims. As a result,
many habeas petitioners' claims of trial and appellate counsels'
ineffectiveness are procedurally defaulted, and they have to persuade the
federal courts that they fall within one of the narrow exceptions to the
procedural default doctrine.
There are two exceptions to this procedural barrier to review. First, if
the defendant can show cause for failing to comply with the state procedural
rule and prejudice to the outcome of her case, the federal court will look
past the default and consider the underlying constitutional claim.8
Alternatively, if the defendant can show that there has been a fundamental
miscarriage of justice in his case-meaning that his conviction resulted in
the incarceration of someone who is probably innocent-the federal court
will consider his constitutional claims.
The existence of cause for a procedural default ordinarily turns on
whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the
defense impeded the defendant's efforts to comply with the state procedural
rules." Examples of such external factors include a change in the law or
interference by state officials. Importantly, the Supreme Court has held that
only attorney error that rises to the level of a constitutional violation can be
cause to excuse a procedural default. 90 So if the reason why a habeas
petitioner defaulted his ineffective assistance of trial and/or appellate
counsel claim is that his post-conviction lawyer failed to raise it, the
incompetence of his post-conviction lawyer cannot be cause to excuse that
procedural default because there is no constitutional right to post-conviction
counsel. Given that a majority of jurisdictions require defendants to wait
until state post-conviction to raise trial and attorney ineffectiveness, the
86. See King Report, supra note 77, at 6 (noting that, in 24% of non-capital cases, claims were
dismissed because the claims were either unexhausted or procedurally defaulted).
87. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87.
88. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 301 (1995).
89. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,488 (1986).
90. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755.
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failure to raise the claims properly is often attributable to statutorily
provided or pro bono post-conviction counsel. As a result, many federal
habeas petitioners are unable to show cause.
A small number of states allow defendants to raise ineffective assistance
of trial counsel claims on direct appeal.91 in those jurisdictions, if the first
appellate attorney fails to properly raise the claim, the appellate attorney's
incompetence could be grounds for cause. However, many of these
defendants run afoul of another procedural restriction. According to
Edwards v. Carpenter,92 a habeas petitioner's grounds for cause must
themselves be exhausted in the state courts; otherwise, the petitioner has to
show cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse
the failure to present the cause ground to the state court. So before the
appellate attorney's incompetence can be used as cause to excuse the
procedural default for failing to raise the trial attorney's incompetence, there
must be a competent post-conviction attorney who properly raises and
exhausts the appellate attorney's incompetence. If the post-conviction
attorney screws up and fails to properly exhaust the claim of appellate
counsel's ineffectiveness, then the claim of appellate attorney
ineffectiveness is itself defaulted, and the post-conviction attorney's error
cannot be cause to excuse that default, because defendants have no
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel.
So if a defendant has an ineffective trial attorney, an ineffective
appellate attorney, and an ineffective state post-conviction attorney who
fails to raise the ineffectiveness of the prior attorneys, that defendant will
likely be barred from having any claim of attorney ineffectiveness
considered on federal habeas. Perversely, the more ineffective attorneys
you have, the less likely you are to obtain federal habeas review.
Even for those habeas petitioners who manage to successfully navigate
through these procedural barriers to review and have their attorney
ineffectiveness claims considered on the merits, their chances of obtaining
federal habeas corpus relief are limited by the standard of review that
federal courts use when entertaining challenges to state court criminal
convictions on habeas. According to 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d), "[a]n
application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
91. See Primus, supra note 30, at 710-12 (summarizing these states' approaches).
92. 529 U.S. 446,451,453 (2000).
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Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]" 93
In order to be "contrary to" clearly established Federal law, the state court's
statement of the law must directly contradict a statement of the law made by
the United States Supreme Court in a holding of one of its cases. 94 To be an
"unreasonable application" of clearly established Federal law, the state
court's application of a legal principle must be more than just wrong; it
must be unreasonably wrong. 95 The Supreme Court recently explained just
how difficult it is for a habeas petitioner to demonstrate that a state court's
decision regarding trial or appellate counsels' effectiveness is unreasonably
wrong. According to the Court, because the standards created by Strickland
v. Washington and section 2254(d) are both "highly deferential," when the
two apply in tandem the federal court's review is "doubly" deferential.96
Specifically, the Court noted that, "[w]hen § 2254(d) applies, the question is
not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether
there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's
deferential standard." 9 7 Overcoming this double deference is made even
more difficult, because most habeas petitioners are not permitted to
supplement the state court record on trial attorney ineffectiveness at the
federal habeas stage.98 Without additional evidence, it is often difficult to
show that a state court decision on trial or appellate counsels' effectiveness
was unreasonable.
In the end, many habeas petitioners are unable to have their attorney
ineffectiveness claims heard on the merits in federal habeas; 99 and even
those who are able to obtain actual review of the claims are highly unlikely
to succeed given the limits on bringing in new evidence and the "doubly"
deferential standard of federal review. As long as procedural and
substantive restrictions preclude federal courts from checking state court
violations of the right to counsel, the systematic underenforcement of that
right in state criminal prosecutions will persist. 00
93. 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1).
94. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
95. See id. at 407.
96. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011).
97. Id.
98. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (limiting the circumstances under which habeas petitioners can
get evidentiary hearings in federal court); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011)
(holding that federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) is limited to the record before the state
court, such that new information provided by a federal evidentiary hearing is not relevant to that analysis).
99. See King Report, supra note 77, at 9 (noting that, in 42% of non-capital cases, the district
court dismissed all claims without reaching the merits).
100. For a more detailed discussion of systemic underenforcement of the right to counsel in state
criminal justice systems, see Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision ofHabeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 17-21 (2010).
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V. WAYS TO STRENGTHEN THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

The preceding remarks have demonstrated how, at every stage of the
criminal process from trial through direct appeal and state post-conviction
review and into federal habeas corpus, the criminal defendant's fundamental
right to effective counsel is systematically violated or routinely
underenforced. Even though it is politically unpopular to do anything to
0 both the federal executive and legislative
promote defendants' rights,o'
branches have come to recognize the severity of the right to counsel crisis
and have begun considering possible reforms.' 02 There are many potential
ways to strengthen and give meaning to the right to counsel in state criminal
cases. It can be done through the states, by the federal government, or
independent of the judiciary altogether. Some of these options are simple
while others are more complex, and some are more politically feasible than
others. I do not intend to fully explain the pros and cons of each idea or
make an ultimate recommendation about which combination of proposals is
best. Rather, the following subsections merely canvas the options and direct
readers to the appropriate sources to consider them more in depth.
A. Through the States
Many have argued that the states should provide better training for state
level public defenders and more funding for indigent defense generally. 0 3
The Southern Public Defender Training Center, for example, recently began
a fellowship program committed to the recruitment, training, and mentoring
of a new generation of public defenders.1" We should have more training
programs like these, but training can only be a partial solution. If the
caseloads remain the same, even well-trained attorneys will not be able to
effectively represent their clients.

101. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante
Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 252 (1997) ("Legislatures, responding to voters
fearful of crime, have no incentive to devote scarce resources to .. . [criminal] defense[.]").
102. See sources collected supra note 51.
103. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Rapping, National Crisis, National Neglect: Realizing Justice Through
Transformative Change, 13 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 331, 333 (2009-10) (arguing for broader and
better training of public defenders); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defenderfor
the 21st Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 90-92 (1995) (same); Stuntz, supra note 75, at 70-71
(arguing for more funding).
104. See Rapping, supra note 103 (describing a new initiative called the Public Defender Corps. a fellowship program committed to the recruitment, training, and mentoring of a new generation of
public defenders in the south); see also The Southern Public Defender Training Center, available at
http://www.thespdtc.org/ (last visited July 7, 2011) (describing the Southern Public Defender Training
Center and its mission).
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In addition to funding for more training, public defender offices
nationwide need funding to ensure that caseloads numbers do not exceed
national standards. Admittedly, the amount of funding that would be
required to make a difference is significant. There are, however, a number
of possible ways to get additional funding for indigent defense. Some
scholars have argued for a trade-off: more funding up front and fewer
criminal procedure rights for defendants later.'os Alternatively, some have
argued that the states could re-direct significant funds to indigent defense by
eliminating or decriminalizing a number of petty offenses.1 0 6 "By diverting
or reclassifying these offenses as non-criminal violations, local and state
governments could save hundreds of millions, perhaps more than $1 billion
per year." 07 That money could, in turn, be channeled into indigent defense.
More funding will only redress some of the problem. States can and
should consider using the state judiciary to better address problems of
attorney ineffectiveness. One possible way to ensure that the right to
effective trial counsel is meaningful involves a structural modification to
criminal appellate practice that would allow defendants to raise ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal and give them a means of
supplementing the trial record in order to substantiate these claims. A small
number of jurisdictions already do this, either judicially or legislatively,
with varying degrees of success.'0 8
I have written extensively about this option elsewhere,109 so I will just
sketch out the proposal here. In order for this mechanism of appellate
review to serve as a successful means of checking the quality of trial
representation, states must first ensure that each criminal defendant is given
new appellate counsel for the first appeal as of right. That appellate
attorney should then have at least six months to re-investigate the
defendant's case and look through the trial court record to determine
whether it is appropriate to seek to supplement the record in order to support
an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. If it is not appropriate to
raise such a claim, the appellate attorney will file an "on the record" brief.
However, if it is appropriate to raise a personal and/or structural
ineffectiveness challenge, the appellate attorney will file a motion for a new
trial in the trial court alleging that there was ineffective trial attorney
105. See, e.g., Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the FederalRole in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 819-21 (2009) (proposing to eliminate federal habeas review entirely
for most state prisoners and reallocate the resources currently spent on federal habeas review to improve
the quality of defense representation throughout the country).
106. See, e.g., Boruchowitz, supra note 16, at 1-2.
107. Boruchowitz, supra note 16, at 2.
108. See, e.g., Primus,supra note 30, at 710-12 (summarizing these states' approaches).
109. See Primus, supra note 30.
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performance and asking for a hearing. The filing of that motion would toll
the time for filing the appellate brief until after the trial court has ruled on
the new trial motion. If the motion, together with its supporting materials,
states a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the trial
judge would be obligated to grant the defendant a hearing to expand the trial
record. After that hearing, the trial judge will rule on the motion. If the
defendant loses, the appellate attorney can then file an appellate brief,
including the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, along with any
other claims that are clear on the face of the trial record.
This structural modification to criminal appeals would force state
appellate court judges to address the structural and personal ineffectiveness
problems that are currently swept under the rug in state post-conviction
review. Moreover, it would allow more defendants to have a meaningful
opportunity to challenge their trial attorneys' performance. Defendants
would have the assistance of counsel to raise ineffective assistance of trial
counsel challenges, and they would be given the opportunity to do so earlier
in the process when they still have an incentive to challenge their
convictions.
Another possible way to address structural ineffectiveness in state
criminal justice systems is through civil class actions in the state courts. 0
A number of class action lawsuits have been filed throughout the country,
and at least some courts have been receptive to these claims. In some cases,
these lawsuits have resulted in consent decrees that have resulted in positive
changes to indigent defense delivery systems."' In other cases, the state
courts have been hostile to these lawsuits." 2 Still other courts have taken a
middle ground position, allowing some claims but foreclosing others."13
B. The FederalGovernment
There are many ways that the federal government could take significant
steps toward improving the provision of indigent defense services in the
states. The federal judiciary, for example, could make the right to counsel
110. See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generationof Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 427, 444-48 (2009) (describing the proliferation of these class actions).
Ill . See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, A Legislative Approach to Indigent Defense Reform, AM. CONST.
soC'Y FOR LAW AND POL'Y ISSUE BRIEF 3-4 (July 2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/files/ACS
%201ssue%20Brief/o20-%20Drinan%201ndigent%2oDef%20Reform_0.pdf (discussing these cases).
112. See, e.g., Duncan v. State, 784 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 2010) (holding that the plaintiffs' claims
were not justiciable).
113. See, e.g., Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 225-26, 904 N.Y.S.2d 296, 304-05 (2010)
(finding cognizable a systemic right-to-counsel claim that alleged actual or constructive denial of counsel altogether, but suggesting that a claim alleging systemic problems in attorney performance would not
be cognizable).
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meaningful by modifying the Strickland v. Washington" 4 standard that is
currently used to judge trial attorney's effectiveness in order to hold defense
counsel to higher standards of performance. This, in turn, might catalyze
the states to do more to provide effective trial representation.
Additionally, the Supreme Court could recognize a limited
constitutional right to effective post-conviction counsel to raise attorney
ineffectiveness claims."l5 That would give state criminal defendants who
must wait until state post-conviction review proceedings to raise trial and
appellate counsels' ineffectiveness a realistic ability to raise these claims.
Moreover, it would ensure that a state post-conviction attorney's failure to
properly raise trial and/or appellate counsels' ineffectiveness could be cause
to excuse a state procedural default. This would open the doors for at least
some defendants to have their claims heard in federal court in habeas
proceedings.
Congress could allocate more federal resources to aid states in funding
indigent defense. Alternatively, it could enact legislation designed to open
the doors of the federal courts to claims of systemic violations of the right to
counsel in the states. This legislation could take the form of federal
enforcement actions, in which the Department of Justice is tasked with
investigating state practices and filing federal lawsuits designed to improve
the provision of indigent defense services in states that engage in systematic
violations of the right to counsel;"l 6 an independent private cause of action
that would allow individual litigants to obtain damages or injunctive relief
when their rights to counsel are violated;"' or a structural modification to
the current scope of federal habeas corpus review so as to permit federal
courts to entertain systemic challenges in habeas." 8
Regardless of what form the federal legislation takes, it is important to
ensure that there is access to the federal courts to raise claims of systemic
state violations of the right to counsel. Many state judges are elected and

114. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.
115. For a more extensive discussion of this option, see Eve Brensike Primus, Procedural Obstacles to Reviewing Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims in State and Federal Postconviction
Proceedings, 24 CRIM. JUST. 6, 11 (2009). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to address this
very question. See Martinez v. Ryan, 2011 WL 380903 (June 6,2011).
116. See S.B. 3842, 111Ith Cong. (2010) (proposing such a federal enforcement action); see also
Eve Brensike Primus, Litigation Strategies for Dealing with the Indigent Defense Crisis, AM. CONST.
at
available
(Sept.
2010),
BRIEF
5-8
ISSUE
AND
POL'Y
LAW
SoC'Y FOR
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Primus%20-%20Litigation%20Strategies.pdf (arguing for a federal enforcement action with a private deputization provision).
117. See Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the
Nation'sIndigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J.ON LEGIS. 487, 498 (2010).
118. See Primus,supra note 100.
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are subject to political pressure to be tough on crime. 119 As a result, they do
not have an incentive to protect indigent defendants' rights. Even though
there are some state judges who are willing to suffer the political
consequences and do what is necessary to improve indigent defense
services, they are the exception rather than the norm. The states have had
more than 45 years to live up to Gideon's promise, and they have failed. It
is now time for the federal government or some independent body to step in
to ensure that the right to counsel is meaningful.
C. Independent of the Government
There are many things that lawyers can do to give more meaning to the
right to counsel and to encourage the state and federal governments to do
more to address the right-to-counsel crisis. As an initial matter, public
defender offices could refuse caseloads that would unduly burden their
attorneys. Some state defender offices have refused to take additional cases
once they have reached the maximum number of cases that they can handle
effectively.12 0 State Bar Associations could work with defender offices and
support them in these efforts in a number of different ways. They could
encourage attorneys throughout the state to donate their time to represent
criminal defendants charged with minor violations.' 2 1 They could hire
private consulting firms to collect data that documents the right-to-counsel
problems in the state, and that data could, in turn, be used to lobby state
1 22
legislatures for additional funding.
119. See Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States, AMERICANBAR.ORG, available at
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/fact-sheet.pdf; see also Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty:
Elective Judiciaries and the Rule ofLaw, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 689, 694 (1995).
120. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
November 9, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ll/09/us/09defender.htmi ("Public
defenders' offices in at least seven states are refusing to take on new cases or have sued to limit them,
citing overwhelming workloads that they say undermine the constitutional right to counsel for the
poor."); see also Tara Cavanaugh, Boone County Public Defenders Refuse Cases, THE MISSOURIAN
(October 18, 2008 5:45 PM), available at http://www.columbiamissourian.com/stories/2008/10/19/
boone-county-public-defenders-refuse-certain-cases; Scott Michels, Facing Budget "Crisis, " Public
Defenders May Refuse Cases, ABC NEWS, June 13, 2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/
story?id=5049461 &page=l; Cheryl Miller, Citing Cuts, Public Defenders Refuse New Cases, LAW.COM,
August 5, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202432773249.
121. See, e.g., Tara Cavanaugh, Timeline of Events for the Missouri Public Defender System, THE
MISSOURIAN (October 19, 2008 6:07 PM), available at http://www.columbiamissourian.com/stories/
2008/10/19/timeline-strain-public-defender-system-has-led-system-now-refusing-certain-cases (explaining how the Missouri Bar Association asked private attorneys to donate their time to represent poor
people charged with minor traffic violations so as to alleviate the burden on the public defender's office).
122. See, e.g., id. (explaining how the Bar Association hired a consulting group to document the
right-to-counsel problems in its indigent defense system, the results of which were used to argue for and
obtain an increase in funding for the public defenders' office); see also Erica J. Hashimoto, Assessing the
Indigent Defense System, AM. CONST. Soc'Y FOR LAW AND POL'Y ISSUE BRIEF I (Sept. 2010), availa-
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The State Bar Associations could also do a better job of ensuring that
criminal defense attorneys provide adequate representation.123 Personal
ineffectiveness should be policed by the State Bar Disciplinary
Commissions, and attorneys who are too lazy or incompetent to provide
effective representation should not be permitted to represent criminal
defendants.
CONCLUSION

The right to the effective assistance of counsel is the most important
right that a criminal defendant has, for it is only through effective counsel
that the defendant's other rights are exercised. Consequently, our failure to
provide criminal defendants with effective counsel distorts the entire
criminal justice system. An adversarial system of criminal justice does not
work without effective advocates.
In these remarks, I have attempted both to explain how criminal
defendants' rights to counsel are being systematically violated and to canvas
possible ways to restore meaning to this fundamental right. As Attorney
General Eric Holder recently said, the problems with our provision of
indigent defense services "are man made [and] are, therefore, susceptible to
man made solutions."1 24 We need to do what is necessary to make the right
to counsel a reality again. The legitimacy of our justice system and the
accuracy of its results both depend on it.

ble at http://www.acslaw.org/files/Hashimoto%201ndigent%20Defense.pdf (arguing that more data
should be collected and used to encourage states to fix their own indigent defense systems).
123. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 2030, 2121122 (2000) ("Bar discipline is almost nonexistent; prosecution for malfeasance is all-but-unheard-of and
always unsuccessful in the rare instances in which it occurs.").
124. Holder Remarks, supra note 19.
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